You can also just destroy the mine with a mortar (if you've built an arsenal and traded resources at the marketplace beforehand) and build a new one in its place if you haven't yet killed the Tatars guarding it. And with extra effort, you can even use that trade caravan to take over the marketplace they were heading and the gold mine, just to recapture them as your own, allowing you to keep upgrading your musketeers and pikemen for what will be pocket change with the constant flow of gold (to the point of making them one-shot everything), rather than struggling under the scripted money rewards of the scenario. By itself, this mission is insanely difficult, but if you threaten the small group of merchants hauling their goods to the local marketplace and then drag them to the village at the starting position in the map, they will capture the place and its worker units, which you can then recapture as your own. The most notable example is the first mission of the Polish campaign in The Art of War.320–9 Google Scholar.By proper maneuvering and use of exploits, it's possible to gain access to worker units and buildings in some campaign missions or single missions of Cossacks: European Wars and its expansions that were written as baseless or with the base being granted far, far later.
Rossiiskii Diplomat ( Moscow: Kvadriga, 2009), pp. Ignat'ev, a diplomatic éminence grise and powerful figure in the empire's Asian policy who was largely responsible for negotiating San Stefano: Khevrolina, B. This disgruntlement was particularly true of Russia's former ambassador at Constantinople, Count N. 195– 219 CrossRef Google Scholar Charles and Jelavich, Barbara Russia in the East 1876–1880 ( Leiden: Brill, 1959), pp. The Eastern Question 1774–1923 ( London: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 120–1 CrossRef Google Scholar Anderson, M. The Making of British Foreign Policy 1865–1914 ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.
565–6 CrossRef Google Scholar Fuller, William Strategy and Power in Russia 1600–1914 ( Toronto: The Free Press, 1992), pp. (ed.) ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. Central Asian rulers were not merely passive bystanders who provided a picturesque backdrop for Anglo–Russian relations, but important actors in their own right.ģ David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye ‘ Russian Foreign Policy 1815–1917’ in Cambridge History of Russia vol. What at first seems like a classic ‘Great Game’ episode was a tale of blundering and unintended consequences on both sides. ‘Abd al-Rahman's ascent to the Afghan throne owed nothing to Russian support, and everything to British desperation. In fact, the Russians did not foresee any of this. The outbreak of the Second Anglo–Afghan war is usually seen as a deliberate attempt by the Russians to embroil the British disastrously in Afghan affairs, leading to the eventual installation of ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, hosted for many years by the Russians in Samarkand, on the Afghan throne. This conflict is usually interpreted within the framework of the so-called ‘Great Game’, which assumes that only the European ‘Great Powers’ had any agency in Central Asia, pursuing a coherent strategy with a clearly defined set of goals and mutually understood rules. Drawing on published documents and research in Russian, Uzbek, British, and Indian archives, this article explains how a hasty attempt by Russia to put pressure on the British in Central Asia unintentionally triggered the second Anglo–Afghan War of 1878–80.